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Abstract
A social choice rule g selects a member of a given set of alternative X as a func-
tion of individual preferences. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem establishes
that if preferences are unrestricted and the range of g has at least three mem-
bers, only dictatorial rules are strategy–proof. However, if the domain of g is the
set of profiles at which there exists a strong Condorcet winner, Campbell and
Kelly [4] have shown that majority–rule is the only non–dictatorial strategy–
proof rule for an odd number of individuals when the range of g contains at least
three alternatives. Dasgupta and Maskin [6] consider the case of a continuum of
voters as a means of circumventing the issue of parity. Although their analysis
provides an approximation for a sufficiently large (but finite) set of individuals,
no exact analysis exists for an arbitrary even number of individuals. We are
therefore interested in characterizing the family of strategy–proof social choice
rules over the Condorcet domain for an even number of individuals. We provide
a full characterization when individual preferences are strict linear orderings,
and prove several propositions concerning strategy-proof rules when individual
preference orderings are permitted to be weak linear orders.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Social choice theory is often characterized as field of impossibility
theorems. Indeed, its inception was largely tied to Arrow’s Theorem
[1], which demonstrated the impossibility of constructing a voting
mechanism that satisfies a number of seemingly innocuous proper-
ties. Since then numerous other impossibility theorems have been
proved, and conditions have been identified under which possibility
theorems may be obtained.
In this paper we focus on the Condorcet domain, the largest do-
main for which majority rule is well–defined. Campbell and Kelly [4]
have shown that majority rule is the only non–dictatorial strategy–
proof rule on the Condorcet domain for an odd number of individuals
and at least three alternatives in the range. Dasgupta and Maskin
[6] consider the case of a continuum of voters as a means of cir-
cumventing the issue of parity. Although their analysis provides an
approximation for a sufficiently large (but finite) set of individuals,
no exact analysis exists for an arbitrary even number of individuals.
We are therefore interested in characterizing the family of strategy–
proof social choice rules over the Condorcet domain for an even
number of individuals.
Chapter 1 begins with a qualitative introduction to the field of so-
cial choice theory. Section 1.2 introduces the standard social choice
notation and definitions in addition to new notation developed in
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this project. Section 1.3 summarizes a number of well–known im-
possibility and possibility results that motivate our research.
In Chapter 2 we consider the strict Condorcet domain; that is, the
Condorcet domain when individual preference orderings are strict
linear orders. Section 2.1 summarizes the Campbell and Kelly [4]
for an odd number of individuals, and concludes with a few exam-
ples. In Section 2.2 we present new results that characterize the
set of strategy–proof social choice rules for an even number of in-
dividuals. We first prove a result for two individuals; the results of
this case are used to structure the proof for an arbitrary even num-
ber of individuals. Section 2.3 consists of a number of examples of
strategy–proof rules over the Condorcet domain, as well as examples
and discussion of manipulable rules.
In Chapter 3 we alter our domain, and focus on the weak Con-
dorcet domain; that is, the Condorcet domain when individual pref-
erence orderings are weak linear orders. Section 3.1 presents a num-
ber of propositions that restrict the behavior of strategy–proof social
choice rules, while Section 3.2 contains examples that highlight fea-
tures of the weak Condorcet domain.
Chapter 4 contains a summary of our results, as well as potential
avenues for future research.
1.1 Social Choice Theory
There are many everyday situations in which a group of individuals
must make a collective decision: an academic department electing a
chair, a community deciding which public project to fund, a family
choosing a restaurant at which to eat dinner. Similarly, there are
situations in which a group must collectively order a set of alter-
natives, such as candidates for a job or college applicants. Social
choice theory provides an axiomatic framework in which to analyze
such decision processes.
The field of social choice theory is primarily concerned with the
formal analysis of collective decision–making processes. The roots
of the field date to 1785, when the French philosopher and mathe-
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matician Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Con-
dorcet published his Essays on the Application of Analysis to the
Probability of Majority Decisions [3]. Among other topics, the es-
say introduced the Condorcet method, a formulation of majority
rule, and illustrated Condorcet’s Voting Paradox, which states that
group preferences may be intransitive even when individual prefer-
ences are not. This paper will focus exclusively on the Condorcet
domain, the largest domain for which Condorcet’s method is well–
defined without the addition of a tie–breaking (or cycle–breaking)
mechanism.
The field was founded in its modern form by the work of Ken-
neth Arrow in 1951, and was propelled forward by early landmark
results, including Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [1] and its refine-
ments. Arrow’s theorem sets forth a number of natural properties
we might desire a decision–making rule to possess, then shows that
the properties are incompatible. We give a qualitative version of
Arrow’s theorem here; a formal version follows in Section 1.2.
Theorem 1.1.1 (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem). Suppose there
are at least two voters and at least three alternatives. Then no de-
terministic voting rule that produces a linear ordering of the alter-
natives as a function of voter preferences can simultaneously exhibit
all of the following properties:
1. The rule is defined for all specifications of voter preferences.
2. There is no individual for whom the societal ranking always
corresponds with his or her individual ranking.
3. Regardless of voter preferences, the introduction (or removal) of
alternatives does not change the relative ranking of the existing
(or remaining) alternatives.
4. If a voter promotes an alterative in his or her individual rank-
ing, the alternative can never be demoted in the societal rank-
ing.
5. Every possible ranking of the alternatives is attainable as the
societal ranking of some set of voter preferences.
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Another famous result was developed in independently by Gib-
bard [9] and Satterthwaite [14]. The result is closely related to
Arrow’s theorem; Reny [13] provides a single proof that yields both
results. Again, we present the theorem informally.
Theorem 1.1.2 (Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem). Suppose there
are at least two voters and at least three alternatives, and that voter
are allowed to have any preferences over the set of alternatives. Then
one of the following must be true for any deterministic voting rule
that selects one alternative as a function of the voter preferences:
1. One of the voters is a dictator, so the rule always chooses from
that voter’s most–preferred set of alternatives.
2. There is some alternative that is never selected by the rule.
3. There exist situations in which an individual voter can bene-
fit from misrepresenting his or her preferences over the set of
alternatives.
Social choice theory therefore provides a framework in which col-
lective decision–making processes can be analyzed axiomatically. A
social choice rule is a mechanism for choosing an alternative as a
function of individual preferences. Within the field, there are multi-
tudes of identified properties a given rule might display; of particular
interest in this paper are the properties of dictatorship and suscep-
tibility to strategic manipulation. These properties, as well as the
notation and definitions common in the field, are introduced in the
next section.
1.2 Notation and Definitions
Let N be the set of individuals indexed by the natural numbers,
1, . . . , n. Let X = {x1, . . . , xm} be the set of alternatives. In gen-
eral, there can be any number of individuals and any number of
alternatives.
Let LW (X) denote the set of weak linear orders on the set X and
let LS(X) denote the set of strict linear orders onX. Each individual
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has a preference order over the alternatives in X that is a member
of LW (X) (we will sometimes further restrict individual preferences
to LS(X)). In the case of an infinite number of alternatives, we
will restrict LW (X) and LS(X) to include only those strict linear
orderings with a maximal (or most–preferred) element. Clearly, we
have LS(X) ⊂ LW (X). These axiomatic assumptions coincide with
out intuitive understanding of individual preferences:
• Complete: For all pairs of alternatives (xi, xj), individuals have
some preference relation (potentially indifference) over the pair.
• Transitive: For all triples of alternatives (xi, xj , xk), no indi-
vidual would simultaneously prefer xi to xj , xj to xk, and xk
to xi.
• Asymmetric Part: There exist pairs of alternatives (xi, xj) for
which individuals strictly prefer alternative xi to xj .
• Symmetric Part: There exist pairs of alternatives (xi, xj) for
which individuals are indifferent between the alternatives xi
and xj .
A profile p is a mapping that assigns a preference ordering to
each individual. We let p(i) indicate individual i’s preference order-
ing at profile p. When individual preference orderings are restricted
to LS(X), let pk(i) indicate individual i’s kth most–preferred al-
ternative at profile p. The notation xi ≻p(k) xj is used to indicate
that individual k prefers alternative xi to alternative xj at profile p.
Similarly, xi ∼p(k) xj indicates that individual k is indifferent over
the pair (xi, xj) at profile p.
Example 1.2.1. Suppose that X = {x1, x2, x3}, and that at profiles
p and q (respectively) individual k has the preference orderings
p(k) = (x1 ≻ x2 ≻ x3), q(k) = (x1 ∼ x2 ≻ x3).
These preference orderings indicate that at p individual k prefers
alternative x1 to x2 and x3, and alternative x2 to x3. At profile q
5
individual k prefers alternative x1 and x2 to x3, but is indifferent
between x1 and x2.
Therefore, we have that p ∈ LS(X)
n ⊂ LW (X)
n and q ∈ LW (X)
n\
LS(X)
n.
We can imagine a profile in the form of a 2–dimensional array,
in which each column represents a particular individual’s preference
ordering. When individual preferences are in LS(X), the array has
dimension n × m; for convention we will retain these dimensions
even when individual preferences contain indifference, and could be
visualized in a smaller array. For clarity, we will generally append
a row to the top of the profile matrix to indicate the individual to
whom each column is assigned. The following example illustrates
the use of this notation.
Example 1.2.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and X = {x1, x2, x3}. Then the
profile
p =


1 2 3
x1 x2 x1
x2 x1 x3
x3 x3 x2


indicates that p(1) = (x1 ≻ x2 ≻ x3) and p(3) = (x1 ≻ x3 ≻
x2). Furthermore, we have p1(2) = x2 and p3(3) = x2. Since all
preferences are strict, we have p ∈ LS(X).
Next consider the profile
q =


1 2 3
x1 ∼ x2 x2 x1
x3 x1 ∼ x3 x3
x2

 ,
where q(1) = (x1 ∼ x2 ≻ x3), q(2) = (x2 ≻ x2 ∼ x3), and q(3) =
(x1 ≻ x3 ≻ x2). Since individuals 1 and 2 are indifferent over some
pairs of alternatives, we have q ∈ LW (X) \ LS(X).
We use the notation Np(xi ≻ xj) to indicate the subset of indi-
viduals preferring alternative xi to xj at profile p. Similarly, we use
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Np(xi ∼ xj) to indicate the subset of individuals preferring alterna-
tive xi to xj at profile p. That is,
Np(xi ≻ xj) = {k ∈ N : xi ≻p(k) xj}
and
Np(xi ∼ xj) = {k ∈ N : xi ∼p(k) xj}.
We say that Np(xi ≻ xj) is the coalition preferring xi to xj at
profile p. In the above example, we had Np(x1 ≻ x3) = {1, 3} and
Np(x1 ∼ x2) = {1}. For all xi, xj ∈ X and all profiles p ∈ LW (X),
the sets Np(xi ≻ xj), Np(xi ∼ xj), Np(xj ≻ xi) form a partition of
the set N .
A social choice rule is a function g : ℘ −→ X, where the do-
main ℘ is some profile space. In this paper we are interested in a
specific profile space known as the Condorcet domain, denoted by
℘C. Moreover, we will consider two formulations of the Condorcet
domain:
Definition 1.2.3 (Weak Condorcet Domain). The weak Condorcet
domain is the profile space ℘CW ⊂ LW (X)
n for which at each profile
p ∈ ℘CW there exists some alternative xi ∈ X such that for all
xj ∈ X \ {xi}, |Np(xi ≻ xj)| > |Np(xj ≻ xi)|.
Qualitatively, the weak Condorcet domain consists of all profiles
in LW (X)
n at which there exists some alternative xi that is pre-
ferred to every other alternative xj by a majority of the individuals
who are not indifferent over the pair (xi, xj). An alternative defini-
tion of the weak Condorcet domain exists in the literature; Chapter
3 we formally introduce the alternative definition and justify our
preference for the definition above.
When studying the weak Condorcet domain, we will occasionally
desire to know the number of individuals who have strict preferences
over an alternative pair (xi, xj). We will therefore define
µp(xi, xj) = |Np(xi ≻ xj)|+ |Np(xj ≻ xi)|
to be the number of individuals who have strict preferences over an
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alternative pair (xi, xj) at profile p.
Definition 1.2.4 (Strict Condorcet Domain). The strict Condorcet
domain is the profile space ℘CS ⊂ LS(X)
n for which at each profile
p ∈ ℘CS there exists some alternative xi ∈ X such that for all
xj ∈ X \ {xi}, |Np(xi, xj)| >
n
2
.
Qualitatively, the strict Condorcet domain consists of all profiles
in LS(X)
n at which there exists some alternative xi that is preferred
to every other alternative xj by a majority of the individuals. In
both definitions, we say that alternative xi is the Condorcet winner
at profile p, and that a coalition is a majority coalition if |Np(xi ≻
xj)| >
n
2
. In both the strong and weak definitions, it is clear that if
a Condorcet winner exists, it must be unique.
We will next introduce a number of properties that social choice
rules may or may not possess. The definitions of some of the prop-
erties depend on the profile space; when this is the case, we will
present the definition of the property first on LW (A) and then on
LS(A). Since the Condorcet domains are subsets of these more gen-
eral domains, the definitions apply to the Condorcet domains in the
natural way.
Definition 1.2.5 (Weak Dictatorship). Let ℘ ⊂ LW (X). Then a
social choice rule g is dictatorial if there exists some i ∈ N such that
for all p ∈ ℘, g(p) ∈ p1(i). That is, the social choice rule selects
some element from individual i’s set of most–preferred alternatives
at every profile p ∈ ℘.
Definition 1.2.6 (Strict Dictatorship). Let ℘ ⊂ LS(X). Then a
social choice rule g is dictatorial if there exists some i ∈ N such that
for all p ∈ ℘, g(p) = p1(i). That is, the social choice rule selects
individual i’s most–preferred alternative at every profile p ∈ ℘.
Under both definitions, we say that individual i is the dictator.
Definition 1.2.7 (Strategy–Proofness). A social choice rule is ma-
nipulable if there exists an individual i ∈ N and profiles p, q ∈ ℘ such
that p(j) = q(j) for all j 6= i and alternative g(p) ≻q(i) g(q). If this
is the case, we say that individual i can manipulate g at profile q via
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the preference ordering q(i). A social choice rule is strategy–proof if
it is not manipulable.
Definition 1.2.8 (Non–Reversal). A social choice rule satisfies non–
reversal [5, 7] if for all p ∈ ℘, if g(p) = xi, xj ∈ X, and there is
k ∈ N for whom xj ≻p(k) xi, then g(p
′) 6= xj for all p
′ ∈ C such that
p′(ℓ) = p(ℓ) for all ℓ 6= k.
Definition 1.2.9 (Weak Unanimity). Let ℘ ⊂ LW (X). Then a
social choice rule g satisfies unanimity if g(p) = xj at any profile p
for which xj ∈ p1(i) for all i ∈ N and some xj ∈ X.
Definition 1.2.10 (Strict Unanimity). Let ℘ ⊂ LS(X). Then a
social choice rule g satisfies unanimity if g(p) = xj at any profile p
such that p1(i) = xj for all i ∈ N and some xj ∈ X. That is, the
social choice rule selects the common most–preferred alternative at
any profile where such an alternative exists.
In both definitions, we call such a profile p a unanimous profile.
When the profile space is a subset of LS(X), unanimity completely
constrains social choice rules at unanimous profiles. When the pro-
file space is a subset of LW (X) only, unanimity is much less binding,
as the following example illustrates.
Example 1.2.11. Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of individuals, X =
{x1, x2, x3, x4} be the set of alternatives, and g be a unanimous social
choice rule. Then at the unanimous profile in LS(X)
p =


1 2 3
x1 x1 x1
x4 x2 x3
x3 x4 x2
x2 x3 x4


we have g(p) = x1. However, at the unanimous profile in LW (X)
q =

 1 2 3x1 ∼ x2 x1 ∼ x2 ∼ x3 x1 ∼ x2 ∼ x4
x3 ∼ x4 x4 x3

 ,
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we could have either g(q) = x1 or g(q) = x2.
Definition 1.2.12 (Monotonicity). Let g be a social choice rule,
N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of voters and X = {x1, . . . , xm} be the set
of alternatives. Let p, q ∈ LW (X) be profiles such that there exists
i ∈ N and xk ∈ X such that p(j) = q(j) for all j 6= i and
{xℓ ∈ X : xk ≻p(i) xℓ} ⊂ {xℓ ∈ A : xk ≻q(i) xℓ}.
Then g is monotonic if and only if g(p) = xk ⇒ g(q) = xk.
Qualitatively, monotonicity requires that if g selects an alterna-
tive xk at some profile p, it must also select xk at every profile formed
from p by promoting xk in some individual’s preference ordering.
The previous definitions have referred to the behavior of a social
choice rule over a fixed domain with a fixed number of individuals
and alternatives. The following property concerns the behavior of a
social choice rule with respect to varying numbers of individuals.
Definition 1.2.13 (Consistency). Let g be a social choice rule, X
be the set of alternatives, N1 and N2 be disjoint sets of individuals,
p1 a profile on N1 and X and p2 a profile on N2 and X, with g(p1) =
g(p2). Let p be the profile on N = N1 ∪ N2 such that p(i) = p1(i)
for all i ∈ N1 and p(i) = p2(i) for all i ∈ N2. Then g is consistent
if and only if g(p) = g(p1) = g(p2).
We have defined monotonicity and consistency so that we may
formally introduce Arrow’s theorem in the next section; the reader
may notice that the above definitions coincide with requirements (3)
and (4) in the qualitative statement of Arrow’s theorem.
When studying the strategy–proofness of a particular rule, we
often wish to create a “path” of profiles that lead from one specific
profile to another. For arbitrary profiles p, q ∈ ℘, we call {qt} the
standard sequence (“path”) from profile p to profile q. This path
starts at p, so we set q0 = p. Next, we form qt+1 from profile qt by
replacing individual t+1’s preference ordering with q(t+1). So for
an arbitrary t, qt(i) = q(i) for all i = 1, . . . , t and qt(i) = p(i) for all
i = t+1, . . . , n. Using this procedure, we have qn = q. When using a
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standard sequence, we must ensure that qt ∈ ℘C for all t = 0, . . . , n.
In general p, q ∈ ℘C does not imply that {q
t} ∈ ℘C , as the following
example illustrates.
Example 1.2.14. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} be the set of individuals,
X = {x1, x2, x3} be the set of alternatives, and ℘ = ℘CS . Consider
the following profiles p, q ∈ ℘CS .
p =


1 2 3 4
x1 x3 x2 x1
x2 x1 x1 x3
x3 x2 x3 x2

 , q =


1 2 3 4
x2 x2 x2 x1
x1 x3 x1 x3
x3 x1 x3 x2

 .
At profile p alternative x1 is the Condorcet winner, since
|Np(x1 ≻ x2)| = |{1, 2, 4}| = 3 >
4
2
, and |Np(x1 ≻ x3)| = |{1, 3, 4}| = 3 >
4
2
.
At profile q alternative x2 is the Condorcet winner, since
|Nq(x2 ≻ x1)| = |{1, 2, 3}| = 3 >
4
2
, and |Nq(x2 ≻ x3)| = |{1, 2, 3}| = 3 >
4
2
.
If {qt} is the standard sequence from p to q, from above we have
q0, q4 ∈ ℘CS . However, the profile
q1 =


1 2 3 4
x2 x3 x2 x1
x1 x1 x1 x3
x3 x2 x3 x2


is not in the domain ℘CS , since in Condorcet winner exists at q
1.
Of the infinite social choice rules one could consider, will focus
primarily on majority rule, which is defined as follows.
Definition 1.2.15. Let N be the set of voters and X be the set
of alternatives. Define majority rule to be the social choice rule
gC : ℘ −→ X, where for all p ∈ ℘ g selects the Condorcet winner at
profile p, if one exists.
11
We are motivated in our research first by the existence of impos-
sibility theorems, which limit the results that can be obtained on
arbitrary profile space domains. Having developed the necessary no-
tation and definitions, we next formally introduce Arrow’s theorem,
which largely motivated the modern study of social choice.
Theorem 1.2.16 (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem). Let N be the
set of voters and X be the set of alternatives, with |N | ≥ 2 and
|X| ≥ 3. Let g : ℘ −→ X be a social choice rule. Then g must fail
to satisfy one of the following properties:
1. The rule is well defined over the domain ℘ = LW (X)
n.
2. g is non–dictatorial.
3. g is consistent.
4. g is monotonic.
5. g is onto.
We also formally introduce the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem,
a corollary of Arrow’s theorem [13].
Theorem 1.2.17 (Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem). Let N be the
set of voters and X be the set of alternatives, with |N | ≥ 2 and
|X| ≥ 3. Let g : ℘ −→ X be a social choice rule. Then g must
satisfy one of the following properties:
1. g is dictatorial.
2. g does not have full range X over the domain ℘.
3. g is subject to strategic manipulation.
As we shall see, possibility results can be obtained by restricting
the domain to be the Condorcet domain.
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Chapter 2
The Strict Condorcet
Domain
In this chapter we are concerned with characterizing non–dictatorial
strategy–proof rules over the strict Condorcet domain. Our analysis
will proceed in two general cases: when there are an odd number of
individuals, and when there is an even number of individuals. The
characterization for the odd case is provided by Campbell and Kelly
[4]; this paper provides the characterization for the even case.
Throughout this chapter, we will use the notation ℘ to refer to
℘CS since in every instance we refer to the strict Condorcet domain.
Additional simplifying notation will be introduced as necessary.
2.1 An Odd Number of Individuals
The characterization of strategy–proof social choice rules over any
domain is not trivial. In general, many of the standard rules are not
strategy–proof on a given domain. The following example illustrates
a common rule that is not strategy–proof on the strict Condorcet
domain with an odd number of individuals.
Example 2.1.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of individuals and
X = {x1, x2, x3, x4} be the set of alternatives. At any profile p ∈ ℘,
13
define Borda’s rule gB(p) by the following procedure
1. For each i ∈ N , individual i gives 4− j points to the jth ranked
in p(i).
2. Let gB(p) select the alternative with the largest number of points.
Consider the profile
p =


1 2 3
x1 x1 x2
x2 x2 x1
x3 x3 x3
x4 x4 x4

 ,
at which the Borda scores are
x1 : 11, x2 : 10, x3 : 6, x4 : 3,
so that gB(p) = x1. Next consider the profile
q =


1 2 3
x1 x1 x2
x2 x2 x3
x3 x3 x4
x4 x4 x1

 ,
which is formed from profile p by changing individual 3’s preference
ordering. At q the Borda scores are
x1 : 9, x2 : 10, x3 : 7, x4 : 4,
so that gB(q) = x2. Since x2 = gB(q) ≻p(3) gB(p) = x1, individual 3
can manipulate at profile p via the preference ordering q(3).
Campbell and Kelly [4] have shown that majority rule is the
unique non–dictatorial strategy–proof rule on the strict Condorcet
domain when there are an odd number of voters.
Theorem 2.1.2 (Campbell & Kelly). Assume that n > 1 is odd
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and X has at least three members. If X is finite and g : ℘ −→ X
is a strategy–proof and non–dictatorial rule with range X, then g is
majority rule. If X is infinite and g : ℘ −→ X is a strategy–proof
rule, with range X, then g is majority rule.
The proof consists of three steps. The first step establishes that
a strategy–proof rule on the strict Condorcet domain must be unan-
imous. The second step shows that if a social choice rule g is non–
dictatorial then g must select alternative xi at every profile where
more than half of the individuals have xi top–ranked. In the third
step, the results of the first and second steps are used to show that
in fact g coincides with majority rule.
The hypothesis that n is odd is crucial to their proof. Without
this assumption it is impossible to complete the first step of their
proof because in fact it is not true; strategy–proof social choice rules
on the Condorcet domain with an even number of individuals need
not satisfy unanimity. The following example demonstrates this
result.
Example 2.1.3. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of individuals and
X = {x1, x2, x3} be the set of alternatives. Suppose that n is even
and define a social choice rule g on ℘ as follows: if alternative xi
is the Condorcet winner at p, then g(p) = x2; if x2 is the Condorcet
winner, then g(p) = x3; if x3 is the Condorcet winner, then g(p) =
x1.
This rule is indeed strategy–proof over the domain (we will see
that no individual can manipulate any social choice rule to change
the Condorcet winner when there are an even number of individ-
uals). However, it is not majority rule and furthermore does not
satisfy unanimity: at any profile where all individuals have the same
top–ranked alternative, that alternative is not selected. Thus in the
case of an even number of individuals, there exist non–dictatorial
strategy–proof social choice rules distinct from majority rule, in-
cluding rules that do not satisfy unanimity.
We note that the rule in the previous example is defined over
the Condorcet domain for an odd number of individuals, but is not
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strategy–proof as the following example illustrates.
Example 2.1.4. Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of individuals and
X = {x1, x2, x3} be the set of alternatives. Define a social choice
rule g on ℘ as follows: if alternative xi is the Condorcet winner at
p, then g(p) = x2; if x2 is the Condorcet winner, then g(p) = x3; if
x3 is the Condorcet winner, then g(p) = x1.
Consider the profile
p =


1 2 3
x1 x3 x1
x2 x1 x3
x3 x2 x2


where it can be verified that x1 is the Condorcet winner, so that
g(p) = x2. Next, consider the profile
q =


1 2 3
x3 x3 x1
x2 x1 x3
x1 x2 x2


for which q(i) = p(i) for i = 2, 3. At profile q, alternative x3 is the
Condorcet winner, so that g(q) = x1. Since x1 = g(q) ≻p(1) g(p) =
x2, individual 1 can manipulate at p by reporting the preference or-
dering q(1). Therefore, g is not strategy–proof.
By example there exist strategy–proof rules on the Condorcet
domain for an even number of individuals that do not satisfy the
unanimity property. To further investigate the Campbell–Kelly re-
sult as it pertains to an even number of voters, let us restrict our
attention to rules that satisfy unanimity. The following example
proposes such a rule.
Example 2.1.5. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of individuals and
X = {x1, x2, x3} be the set of alternatives. Suppose that n > 2 is
even and define a social choice rule g on ℘ as follows: if alternative
x1 is the Condorcet winner at p, g(p) = p1(1); if x2 is the Condorcet
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winner, g(p) = p1(2); if x3 is the Condorcet winner, g(p) = p1(3).
That is, individual i is the dictator over the subset of the domain
for which alternative xi is the Condorcet winner, for i = 1, 2, 3.
The social choice rule defined in the previous example obviously
satisfies unanimity. Furthermore, it is non–dictatorial and strategy–
proof over the entire domain but vastly different from majority rule.
Thus the results of Campbell and Kelly [4] cannot be extended to an
even number of individuals by simply requiring unanimity. Again
we note that g is defined over the Condorcet domain for an odd
number of individuals but is not strategy–proof, as the following
example illustrates.
Example 2.1.6. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of individuals and
X = {x1, x2, x3} be the set of alternatives. Suppose that n > 2 is
even and define a social choice rule g on ℘ as follows: if alternative
x1 is the Condorcet winner at p, g(p) = p1(1); if x2 is the Condorcet
winner, g(p) = p1(2); if x3 is the Condorcet winner, g(p) = p1(3).
Consider the profile
p =


1 2 3
x3 x1 x1
x1 x2 x3
x2 x3 x2


where it can be verified that x1 is the Condorcet winner, so that
g(p) = p1(1) = x3. Next, consider the profile
q =


1 2 3
x3 x3 x1
x1 x2 x3
x2 x1 x2


for which q(i) = p(i) for i = 1, 3. At profile q, alternative x3 is the
Condorcet winner, so that g(q) = p1(3) = x1. Since x1 = g(q) ≻p(2)
g(p) = x3, individual 2 can manipulate at p by reporting the prefer-
ence ordering q(2). Therefore, g is not strategy–proof.
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We have seen several examples illustrating how the parity of the
number of voters has a dramatic impact on the strategy–proofness
of a given social choice rule. In the next section, we characterize
strategy–proof rules over the Condorcet domain with an even num-
ber of individuals.
2.2 An Even Number of Individuals
When there are an odd number of individuals, Campbell and Kelly
[4] have majority rule is the unique non–dictatorial strategy–proof
social choice rule over the Condorcet domain. We will show that
when there are are an even number of individuals, there is a large
family of strategy–proof rules, including some that are rather exotic.
This result hinges on our ability to partition the Condorcet domain
into a number of subdomains between which individuals are unable
to manipulate. Such a separation is not possible for an odd number
of individuals. This restriction on individuals’ ability to manipulate
allows flexibility in forming strategy–proof social choice rules, so
that majority rule is but one of many.
We begin with a characterization of strategy–proof rules where
there are two individuals. By considering such a limited case, our
result and proof are relatively straightforward. We will therefore
use this case as a means of developing intuition for the general case
of an even number of individuals. When considering the general
case, we will structure our proof to mimic the structure of the two
individual cases.
2.2.1 A Characterization for Two Individuals
We next characterize the family of social choice rules that are non–
dictatorial and strategy–proof over the strict Condorcet domain ℘
with two individuals and three or more alternatives. By limiting
the number of individuals to n = 2 our domain can be character-
ized more precisely than in the general case of any even number n
of individuals. In fact, the set of profiles that admit a Condorcet
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winner with n = 2 individuals is the set of all profiles for which both
individuals have the same most–preferred alternative.
This characterization leads to a useful partition of the domain.
We use the notation ℘xi to indicate the set of profiles in the do-
main for which alternative xi is the Condorcet winner. Clearly, we
have ℘xi ⊂ ℘, and we will accordingly refer to ℘xi as a subdomain.
Furthermore, we will use the notation Xxi to indicate the set of al-
ternatives that are selected over the subset ℘xi; that is, the range
of g restricted to ℘xi. This notation is necessary because while we
require that g be onto with respect to the domain ℘, we cannot
guarantee that every alternative will be selected over a given subset
of the domain.
To motivate our discussion, let us first consider an example of a
social choice rule over ℘ that is not strategy–proof.
Example 2.2.1. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, x2, x3}
be the set of alternatives, and g be a a social choice rule over ℘ de-
fined by
g(p) =
{
p2(1) if p(1) = p(2)
p1(1) otherwise
,
for all profiles p ∈ ℘. For profiles
p =


1 2
x1 x1
x2 x3
x3 x2

 , q =


1 2
x1 x1
x2 x2
x3 x3

 ,
we have g(p) = x1 and g(q) = x2. At profile q, both individuals
prefer alternative x1 to the outcome, x2. At q, individual 2 can elicit
the selection of alternative x1 by reporting the preference ordering
p(2), since g(p) = x1 ≻q(2) x2 = g(q). Therefore, the social choice
rule g is manipulable.
Having considered this example, we will state the following the-
orem and proceed with a formal proof.
Theorem 2.2.2. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, x2, x3, . . . }
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be the set of alternatives, and g be a social choice rule with domain
℘. Then g is strategy–proof and non–dictatorial if and only if:
(i) If g(p) = xi for any profile pin℘xi, then g(p) = xi for all profiles
p ∈ ℘xi.
(ii) If there exists xi ∈ X such that |Xxi| ≥ 2, then there exists
k ∈ N such that individual k is dictatorial over ℘xi with respect
to the set of alternatives Xxi.
(iii) There exists some xi ∈ X such that for all p ∈ ℘xi, g(p) 6= xi.
We prove the theorem by proving three lemmas concerning the
strategy–proofness of three classes of social choice rules whose dis-
joint union is the set of all social choice rules: (1) rules that always
select the common top–ranked alternative; (2) rules that never se-
lect the common top–ranked alternative; (3) rules that sometimes
select the common top–ranked alternative and sometimes do not.
Class 1 Rules
We fist consider rules that always select the common top–ranked
alternative.
Lemma 2.2.3. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, x2, x3, . . . }
be the set of alternatives, and g be a social choice rule with domain
℘. If g(p) = p1(1) for all p ∈ ℘, then g is strategy–proof.
Proof. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, x2, x3, . . . }
be the set of alternatives, and g be a social choice rule such that
g(p) = p1(1) for all p ∈ ℘. Let p, q ∈ ℘ be such that p1(1) = q1(1),
and let {qt} be the standard sequence from p to q. Since p1(2) =
p1(2) = q1(1) = q1(2), the have {q
t} ⊂ ℘.
At profile p, g(p) = p1(1) by construction. Furthermore, g(q) =
q1(1). Since q1(1) = p1(1), and all the profiles to which individual
1 can manipulate are of the form q, then individual 1 cannot ma-
nipulate to elicit the selection of an alternative other than p1(1).
Since the social choice rule g treats both individuals symmetrically,
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individual 2 cannot manipulate g by the same reasoning. Therefore,
g is strategy–proof.
Unfortunately, it is clear that any rule that always selects the
common top–ranked alternative is dictatorial on ℘ by our previous
definition. This can easily be shown by selecting either individual,
say individual 1, and noting that at all profiles p ∈ ℘, g(p) = p1(1)
when g always selects the common top–ranked alterative. Further-
more, we may note that any rule that does not always select the com-
mon top–ranked alternative cannot be dictatorial on ℘: a rule that
does not always select the common top–ranked alternative equiva-
lently does not always select some individual’s top–ranked alterna-
tive, so that neither individual is a dictator.
Using our original definition of dictatorship, we must therefore
require that there exists some subdomain ℘xi for which xi 6∈ Xxi.
However, we note that when there only two individuals, all profiles
in the domain ℘ are unanimous, so that to reject a dictatorial rule
is to reject a unanimous rule. We will therefore adopt an alternative
definition of dictatorial rule.
Definition 2.2.4 (Non–unanimous Dictatorship). Let ℘ ⊂ LS(X).
Then a social choice rule g is dictatorial if there exists some i ∈ N
such that for all p ∈ ℘, g(p) = p1(i) and there exists some p ∈ ℘
that is not a unanimous profile.
If we adopt this new definition, we have that Class 1 rules are
strategy–proof and non–dictatorial. We next consider a concrete
example of a Class 1 social choice rule g over ℘ with two individuals.
Example 2.2.5. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, x2, x3 . . . }
be the set of alternatives, and g be a Class 1 social choice rule. Then
at profiles p, q ∈ ℘,
p =


1 2
xi xi
...
...

 , q =


1 2
xj xj
...
...

 ,
we have g(p) = xi and g(q) = xj. Note that neither individual faces
21
the incentive to manipulate, because their most–preferred alternative
is selected at both profiles p and q. Furthermore, profile p if either
individual reported a preference ordering with some alternative xk 6=
xi top–ranked, the resulting profile would not admit a Condorcet
winner, and would thus not be part of our domain.
Class 2 Rules
We next consider rules that never select the common top–ranked
alternative.
Lemma 2.2.6. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, x2, x3, . . . }
be the set of alternatives, and g be a social choice rule with domain
℘. If g(p) 6= p1(1) for all p ∈ ℘, then g is strategy–proof if and only
if g is dictatorial over each subdomain ℘xi with respect to the set of
alternatives Xxi.
Proof. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, x2, x3, . . . }
be the set of alternatives, and g be a social choice rule such that
g(p) 6= p1(1) for all p ∈ ℘. Although we have assumed that g has full
range X over the domain ℘, we have made no assumptions about
the range of g over subsets of the domain, ℘xi. To this end, we
will separately consider the cases when |Xxi| = 1, |Xxi| = 2, and
Xxi ≥ 3.
Suppose that |Xxi| = 1 for some sub–domain ℘xi, so that there
exists xj ∈ X such that g(p) = xj for all p ∈ ℘xi (since g never
selects the common top–ranked alternative, i 6= j). Since g selects
the same alternative at every profile p ∈ ℘xi, neither individual can
manipulate g over ℘xi; no individual can elicit the selection of an
alternative other than xj on ℘xi, and no individual can report a pref-
erence ordering with an alternative other than xi most–preferred. A
social choice rule that never selects the common top–ranked alter-
native is therefore strategy–proof over all subsets ℘xi ⊂ ℘ for which
|Xxi| = 1.
Suppose that |Xxi| = 2, so that at all p ∈ ℘xi, g(p) = xj or
g(p) = xk for some distinct xj , xk ∈ X. By assumption, xj , xk 6=
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p1(1), p1(2) for all p ∈ ℘xi. For some enumeration of the alternatives,
either both individuals prefer alternative xj to alternative xk, or one
individual prefers xj to xk and the other prefers xk to xj .
If both individuals prefer xj to xk and g(p) = xj , then neither
individual can elicit the selection of a more–preferred alterative via
manipulation, and our rule is strategy–proof. If both individuals
prefer xj to xk and g(p) = xk, then g is strategy–proof if and only
if g(p) = xk for all p ∈ ℘xi. To verify this, let p be a profile for
which both individuals have xj ranked above xk and g(p) = xk,
and let pi be any profile generated by permuting the ordering of
individual 1’s non–top–ranked alternatives while holding individual
2’s preference ordering constant. If at any pi, g(pi) = xj , then
individual 1 can manipulate at profile p by reporting a preference
ordering of pi(1). Therefore, we must have that g(pi) = xk for all
profiles pi. Now, let qij be any profile generated from a profile pi by
holding individual 1’s preference ordering constant and permuting
the ordering of individual 2’s non–top–ranked alternatives. If at any
qij, g(qij) = xj , then individual 2 can manipulate at profile p
i by
reporting a preference ordering of qij(2). Therefore, we must have
that g(qij) = xk for all profiles q
ij.
Since every profile in ℘xi can be generated by considering all per-
mutations of non–top–ranked alternatives at profile p, we therefore
have that if g(p) = xk, then g is strategy–proof if and only if g selects
alternative xk at every profile p ∈ ℘xi . Since this would contradict
our assumption that |Xz| = 2, a strategy–proof social choice rule
that never selects the common top–ranked alternative also cannot
select the common bottom–ranked alternative from Xxi when one
exists at any p ∈ ℘xi for which |Xxi| = 2.
Suppose now that for some arbitrary enumeration of individu-
als and alternatives, individual 1 prefers xj to xk and individual 2
prefers xk to xj . If g(p) = xj , then individual 1 cannot precipitate
the selection of a more preferred alternative by manipulation, since
xj is his or her most–preferred alternative in Xxi . Furthermore, in-
dividual 2 can only attempt to manipulate permuting the ordering
of his non–top–ranked alternatives. If there exists a profile pi formed
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by holding individual 1’s preference ordering constant at p and per-
muting the order of individual 2’s non–top–ranked alternatives such
that g(pi) = xk, then individual 2 can manipulate at profile p by re-
porting the preference ordering pi(2). Since the above enumeration
of individuals was arbitrary, we have that if g is strategy–proof and
|Xxi| = 2, then g must select some fixed individuals’ most–preferred
alternative from Xxi at every p ∈ ℘xi.
The result of the previous paragraph is consistent with our pre-
vious result that g cannot select a common–bottom ranked alterna-
tive from Xxi at any profile where such an alternative exists. Since
|Xxi| = 2, we may suppose that Xxi = {xj , xk} (by assumption,
xi 6∈ Xxi). If there exists p ∈ ℘xi such that xj ≻p(ℓ) xk for ℓ = 1, 2,
then by the first result g(p) = xj , since there are only two alterna-
tives in the range. Furthermore, xj is some (in fact, both) individ-
ual’s most–preferred alternative from Xxi.
Suppose now that |Xxi| ≥ 3, and note that within the Condorcet
domain preferences are unrestricted with respect to the set of alter-
natives in X \ {xi}. Moreover, note that by construction g has full
range Xxi over ℘xi . These conditions satisfy the hypothesis of the
Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem, so that we may apply the results
to g over ℘xi with respect to the feasible alternatives Xxi. Therefore,
g is strategy–proof over ℘xi if and only if g selects some individual
i’s most–preferred alternative from the set Xxi at every profile p.
We note that the value of i must be constant over each subdomain
p ∈ ℘xi , but may vary between subsets domains.
To see that this characterization holds when we re–admit the al-
ternatives that are never selected over the domain ℘xi, first suppose
that g is dictatorial over ℘xi with respect to the restricted set of
alternatives Xxi. That is, there exists some individual i such that g
selects individual i’s most–preferred alternative from the set Xxi at
every profile p ∈ ℘xi. First, we note that individual i cannot pre-
cipitate the selection of any alternative he or she prefers to the one
selected by g, as g selects her most–preferred alterative from the fea-
sible set Xxi. Furthermore, individual j cannot affect the outcome
of g at any profile p ∈ ℘xi , so that individual j cannot benefit from
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reporting a false preference ordering. Moreover, individual j cannot
change the status of the Condorcet winner while remaining within
the domain ℘.
Note further that any social choice rule g that is not strategy–
proof over ℘xi with respect to the set of alternatives Xxi is also
not strategy–proof when we readmit the remaining alternatives: if
some individual i can manipulate g by permuting their ordering of
alternatives in Xxi , they can perform the same permutation when
the irrelevant alternatives are reintroduced. (Imagine reintroducing
the additional alternatives by appending them to the bottom of each
individual’s preference ordering.) Therefore, when |Xxi| ≥ 3 a social
choice rule g is strategy–proof over domain ℘xi if and only if g selects
individual i’s most–preferred alterative from Xxi, for some value of
i that is fixed over each subdomain ℘xi (but not necessarily across
subdomains).
We have therefore completely characterized the set of strategy–
proof social choice rules that never select the common top–ranked
alternative. Next we consider a concrete example.
Example 2.2.7. Let N = {1, 2} be the set of individuals, X =
{x1, x2, x3, x4} be the set of alternatives, and g be a strategy–proof
social choice rule with domain ℘ that never selects the common top–
ranked alternative. Furthermore, suppose that Xx1 = {x2, x3}. Con-
sider the profiles
p =


1 2
x1 x1
x4 x2
x2 x3
x3 x4

 , q =


1 2
x1 x1
x4 x3
x2 x2
x3 x4

 ,
at which g(p) = x2 and g(q) = x3. Since by our previous lemma we
know that g must be dictatorial over ℘x1 with respect to the set of
alternatives Xx1, we can deduce that individual 2 is the dictator of
g over ℘x1.
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Class 3 Rules.
Finally, we will restrict our attention to those rules that sometimes
select the common top–ranked alternative and sometimes do not.
We shall see that the strategy–proofness of these rules can be de-
composed into the previous two lemmas.
Lemma 2.2.8. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, . . . , xm}
be the set of alternatives, and g be a social choice rule with domain
℘. If there exist p, q ∈ ℘ such that g(p) = p1(1) and g(q) = qk(1)
for some k = 2, . . . , m, then g is strategy–proof if and only if
(i) If there exists p ∈ ℘xi such that g(p) = xi, then g(p) = xi for
all p ∈ ℘xi.
(ii) If there exists a subdomain ℘xi over which |Xxi| ≥ 2, then
xi 6∈ Xxi and g is dictatorial over ℘xi with respect to the set of
alternatives Xxi.
Proof. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, x2, x3, . . .} be
the set of alternatives, and g be a social choice rule with domain ℘.
Moreover, suppose that there exist p, q ∈ ℘ such that g(p) = p1(j)
and g(q) = qk(j) for some k 6= 1 and j = 1, 2.
For an arbitrary subdomain ℘xi, suppose that at some profile
p ∈ ℘xi , g(p) = p1(1), so that our social choice rule selects the com-
mon top–ranked alternative at profile p. Consider any profile q ∈ ℘xi
formed from profile p, in which we hold individual 1’s preference or-
dering constant and permute the non–top–ranked alternatives in
individual 2’s preference ordering. If g(q) 6= p1(1), then individual
2 can manipulate at q via p by reporting a preference ordering p(2),
which will ensure the selection of p1(1) = p1(2) = q1(2), individual
2’s top–ranked alternative at profile q. At profile p (respectively, at
every profile q created by permuting individual 1’s non–top–ranked
alternatives at p) we may next consider any profile q′ ∈ ℘xi for
which we hold individual 1’s preference ordering constant and per-
mute the non–top–ranked alternatives in individual 2’s preference
ordering. If g(q′) 6= p1(1) then individual 2 can manipulate at q
′
via p (respectively, via q) to ensure the selection of p1(1) = q1(2),
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which individual 2 prefers to every other alternative at all profiles
q′. Therefore, if g selects the common top–ranked alternative at
some profile in ℘xi, it is strategy–proof if and only if it selects the
common top–ranked alternative at every profile in ℘xi.
Let us return to our arbitrary subset ℘xi and suppose that g never
selects the common top–ranked alternative at any p ∈ ℘xi. Then we
can consider our social choice rule g a Class 2 rule over domain ℘xi
and apply the previous lemma.
We have therefore completely characterized the set of strategy–
proof rules on domain ℘ with n = 2. Using our alternative defini-
tion of non–unanimous dictatorial rules, we may state the following
corollary:
Corollary 2.2.9. Let V = {1, 2} be the set of voters, X = {x1, x2, x3, . . . }
be the set of alternatives, and g be a social choice rule with domain
℘. Then g is strategy–proof and non–dictatorial if and only if:
(i) If there exists p ∈ ℘xi such that g(p) = xi, then for all p ∈ ℘xi,
g(p) = xi.
(ii) If there exists a subdomain ℘xi over which |Xxi| ≥ 2, then
xi 6∈ Xxi and g must be dictatorial over ℘xi with respect to the
set of alternatives Xxi.
Having characterized the family of non–dictatorial and strategy–
proof social choice rules over the Condorcet domain with two indi-
viduals, we next consider the case of an arbitrary even number of
individuals. Our proof in the general case will follow the structure
of the case of two individuals.
2.2.2 A Characterization for any Even Number of Indi-
viduals
Let g be a strategy–proof social choice rule for an even number of
individuals n with domain ℘ and range X. We will first establish
some useful lemmas and definitions.
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Definition 2.2.10 (Restriction of a Social Choice Rule). Let g be
a social choice rule with domain ℘. Let P ⊆ ℘. Define g|P to be the
restriction of g to P defined by mapping p ∈ P into g(p).
Throughout our proof, we will consider the restriction of our
social choice rule g to certain subsets of the domain.
Lemma 2.2.11 (Decomposition Lemma). Let g be a social choice
rule with domain ℘. Suppose there exists a partition Π of ℘ such
that for any P ∈ Π and any i ∈ N , if p ∈ P , q ∈ ℘, and q(j) = p(j)
for all j 6= i, then q ∈ P . Then g is strategy–proof if and only if g|P
is strategy–proof for all P ∈ Π.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward: if from any profile
p ∈ P no individual can manipulate to a profile q ∈ ℘ \ P , then
strategy–proofness within each P is equivalent to strategy–proofness
over the entire domain.
Definition 2.2.12. Denote by ℘xi the set of all profiles at which
alternative xi is the Condorcet winner. We will call the set ℘xi a
Condorcet section.
It can be easily verified that the set of Condorcet sections pro-
duces a partition for even n. Furthermore this partition satisfies
the Decomposition Lemma, so that we can reduce the question of
strategy–proofness over the entire Condorcet domain ℘ to a ques-
tion of strategy–proofness over an arbitrary Condorcet section, ℘xi.
It is therefore sufficient to characterize g|℘xi for an arbitrary xi. As
before, let Xxi denote the range of g|℘xi . With this partition and
decomposition established, we state our main result.
Theorem 2.2.13. Suppose g is a social choice rule over the strict
Condorcet domain for an even number of individuals, with range X.
Then g is strategy–proof if and only if:
(i) If there exists xi ∈ X such that |Xxi| = 2, then g|℘xi satisfies
non–reversal;
(ii) If there exists xi ∈ X such that |Xxi| ≥ 3, then xi 6∈ X and
g|℘xi is dictatorial with respect to the set of alternatives Xxi.
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To structure our proof of the theorem, we consider three cases:
|Xxi| = 1, |Xxi| = 2, and |Xxi| ≥ 3. In each case we will state and
prove a proposition characterizing strategy–proof rules within the
specified framework.
For notational convenience, we will drop the subscripts from our
standard notation for the remainder of this section, as we are only
interested in a single arbitrary subdomain ℘xi . To this end, let
our Condorcet section be simply ℘, over which alternative x is the
Condorcet winner. Furthermore, let us label the elements of the
range of g|℘, so that Xx = {y, z, . . .}; in general we will make no
assumptions as to whether x ∈ Xx or x /∈ Xx. Lastly, we will simply
refer to our social choice rule over this subdomain as g instead of
g|℘.
Case I: |Xx| = 1
Proposition 2.2.14. Any social choice rule g over ℘ with |Xx| = 1
is strategy–proof.
Of course, any social choice rule on any domain is strategy–proof
if it has a singleton range. We note that the proof in this case holds
whether Xx = {x} or Xx 6= {x}. We further note that majority
rule is comprised of this case, with the range over each Condorcet
section being a singleton set containing the Condorcet winner.
Case II: |Xx| = 2
Proposition 2.2.15. A social choice rule g over ℘ with |Xx| = 2
is strategy–proof if and only if g satisfies non–reversal.
Proof. To show necessity, suppose that g does not satisfy the non–
reversal condition. So there are profiles p, p′ ∈ ℘ such that g(p) =
z and g(p′) 6= z. Furthermore, g(p′) = y and there exists some
individual i for whom y ≻p(i) z, and p
′(j) = p(j) for all j 6= i.
Therefore, individual i could manipulate at profile p via p′(i) to
precipitate the selection of alternative y.
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To show sufficiency, suppose that g satisfies the non–reversal con-
dition. If g(p) = z and z ≻p(i) y, then individual i cannot precipitate
the selection of a more–preferred alternative by reporting a prefer-
ence ordering other than p(i). If g(p) = z and y ≻p(i) z, then by the
non–reversal condition individual i cannot unilaterally precipitate
the selection of any other alternative. Thus, g is strategy–proof at
all profiles p.
Here again, we note that the result holds whether x ∈ Xx or
x /∈ Xx. Furthermore, this result applies more generally: any social
choice rule over any domain with a two–element range is strategy–
proof if and only if it satisfies non–reversal.
Case III: |Xx| ≥ 3
Proposition 2.2.16. A social choice rule g over ℘ with |Xx| ≥ 3
is strategy–proof if and only if g is dictatorial with respect to the set
of alternatives Xx.
Sufficiency is clear in this case, so our proof will focus on necessity
and is based on two subcases: when x ∈ Xx and when x /∈ Xx.
When x ∈ Xx, the structure and content of the proof is similar to
Campbell and Kelly [4], but differs at several crucial steps. In the
first step, we show that if x is selected anywhere over ℘ then x must
be selected at all unanimous profiles. The second step establishes
that if g is non–dictatorial, then x must be selected when over half
of the individuals have x top–ranked. The third step shows that
either g is majority rule or g is dictatorial, and that majority rule
is inconsistent with |Xx| ≥ 3.
When x 6∈ Xx, the proof consists of two steps. In the first step
we invoke the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem over a certain subset
of the Condorcet section to show that g restricted to this subset
must be dictatorial. In the second step, we show that strategy–
proofness implies that the dictator over this subset must indeed be
the dictator over the entire Condorcet section with respect to the
set of alternatives Xx.
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Lemma 2.2.17. Let g be a strategy–proof rule with domain ℘ and
range Xx, where |Xx| ≥ 3 and x ∈ Xx. Then g is dictatorial with
respect to the set of alternatives Xx.
Proof. Let g be a strategy–proof rule with domain ℘ and range Xx,
where |Xx| ≥ 3.
Step 1. Let p ∈ ℘ be such that g(p) = x, and let u ∈ ℘ be a
profile at which u1(i) = x for all i ∈ N . Let {u
t} be the standard
sequence from profile p to u. First, we show that ut ∈ ℘ for all t,
so that {ut} ∈ ℘. By assumption p ∈ ℘, so that |Np(x, y)| >
n
2
for
all y 6= x. At each step ut in the standard sequence, we promote
alternative x to the top of individual t’s preference ordering. So
we have |Nut(x, y)| ≥ |Nu(x, y)| >
n
2
for every y 6= x and all t.
Alternative x will therefore remain the Condorcet winner at each
step in the sequence, so that ut ∈ ℘ for t = 0, . . . , n.
We know that g(p) = g(u0) = x. Suppose that g(ut) = x, and
suppose further that g(ut+1) = y, where y 6= x. At profile ut+1
individual t + 1 has x top–ranked, so that x ≻ut+1(t+1) y. Thus,
individual t + 1 could manipulate at profile ut+1 by reporting a
preference ordering of ut(t + 1), precipitating the selection of the
preferred alternative x. Since we have assumed that g is strategy–
proof, we must therefore have that g(ut+1) = x. Thus by induction
we have that g(un) = g(u) = x. So, if g selects alternative x at any
profile in the subdomain, then g must select x at every unanimous
profile in ℘.
Step 2. Next, we show that if g is non–dictatorial, x need only
be top–ranked for more than n
2
individuals at an arbitrary profile
p ∈ ℘ to ensure that g(p) = x.
DefineK(p) = {k ∈ N : x is top–ranked by individual k at profile
p}. Our proof for n
2
< |K(p)| ≤ n will proceed by induction. From
Step 1 we have already established that g(p) = x when |K(p)| = n.
Next we suppose that g(p) = x whenever |K(p)| = k, for n
2
+ 2 ≤
k ≤ n. We will then show that if g(p) 6= x when |K(p)| = k − 1
(that is, when n
2
< |K(p)| ≤ n), then g is dictatorial.
Suppose that x is top–ranked by exactly k − 1 individuals at
profile p ∈ ℘, so that |K(p)| = k − 1. Furthermore, suppose that
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g(p) = y where y 6= x. We will show that this second assumption
implies that for every z ∈ Xx there exists a profile in ℘ where z is
selected even though k− 1 individuals have x top-ranked. This will
allow us to show that that g is dictatorial, so that we must have
g(p) = x when g is non–dictatorial.
Assuming that g(p) = y 6= x, if x ≻p(i) y for some i ∈ N \K(p),
then the induction hypothesis implies that this individual i could
manipulate g at profile p by reporting a preference ordering that
has alternative x top–ranked. Since g is strategy–proof, we conclude
that y ≻p(i) x for all i ∈ N \K(p).
Let q ∈ ℘ be such that q(i) = p(i) for all i ∈ K(p) and q(i) =
(y, x, . . . ) for all i ∈ N \ K(p). Let {qt} ⊂ ℘ be the standard
sequence from p to q. Then g(q0) = y. Furthermore, g(qt) = y and
the strategy–proofness of g imply that g(qt+1) = y, since qt+1 6= qt
implies that t+1 ∈ N \K(p). Hence, y is the top–ranked alternative
for individual t + 1 at profile qt+1, so that g(q) = g(qn) = y by
induction.
Next, let r ∈ ℘ be a profile such that r(i) = (x, . . . , y) for all
i ∈ K(p) and r(i) = q(i) for i ∈ N \K(p). Once again, let {rt} ⊂ ℘
be the standard sequence from profile q to r. Then g(r0) = y. Fur-
thermore, for any t we have that g(rt) ∈ {x, y} by the induction
hypothesis, because any i ∈ N \ K(p) can precipitate the selec-
tion of x by reporting a preference ordering with x top–ranked and
increasing the cardinality of K(p) to k.
Now, suppose that g(rt) = y. If g(rt+1) = x, then t + 1 ∈
K(p) and individual t + 1 can manipulate g at rt by reporting the
preference ordering r(t + 1). Therefore g(rt+1) = y, so we have
g(r) = g(rn) = y.
Let ℘∗ denote the set of profiles in ℘ such that s(i) = r(i) for
all i ∈ K(p), where s(i) is some linear ordering on the set X for all
i ∈ N \ K(p). Define a new social choice rule g∗ on ℘∗ by setting
g∗(s) = g(s) for all s ∈ ℘∗. We will show that the range of g∗ is Xx.
We know that g(r) = y = g∗(r), since in particular r ∈ ℘∗.
Also, if h ∈ N \ K(p), if r′(h) = (x, . . . ), and if r′(i) = r(i) for
all i 6= h, we have g(r′) = x = g∗(r′) by the induction hypothesis.
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Hence, x and y belong to the range of g∗. Now choose an arbitrary
z ∈ Xxi \ {x, y}. Next let s ∈ ℘
∗ be such that s(i) = r(i) for all
i ∈ K(p) and s(i) = (z, y, . . . ) for all i ∈ N \K(p). Let {st} ⊂ ℘∗ be
the standard sequence from r to s. We have g(s0) = y. Suppose that
g(st) = y and g(st+1) 6= z for some t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then g(st+1) = y,
otherwise individual t+ 1 could manipulate g at st+1 via st(t + 1).
Therefore, either g(st) = y for all t, or else g(st) = z for some t. In
the later case, we know that z belongs to the range of g∗. Suppose
however that g(st) = y for all t. In particular, then g(s) = y. Recall
that for i ∈ K(p) we have s(i) = r(i) = (x, . . . , y). We will next
show that g(s) = y leads to a contradiction in this case.
Let w ∈ ℘ be some profile such that g(w) = z, where z ∈ Xx \
{x, y}. Such a profile exists since |Xx| ≥ 3. Let us reorder our
individuals, so that the first k − 1 individuals correspond to those
in K(p), and let {wt} be the standard sequence from s to w. First,
we will show that each member of {wt} is in ℘.
We have s ∈ ℘, so that |Ns(x, x
′)| > n
2
for all x′ 6= x. So,
w0 ∈ ℘, since w0 = s. Next, we have that w1 ∈ ℘, since by replacing
individual 1’s preference ordering at w0 with (x, . . . , y) we have that
|Nw1(x, x
′)| ≥ |Nw0(x, x
′)| > n
2
for all x′ 6= x. Similarly, for each
of the first k − 1 steps in the sequence, the size of the coalitions
preferring alternative x to any other alternative will not decrease.
Therefore, {w0, . . . , wk−1} ⊂ ℘.
Next we note that at profile wk−1, there are k−1 > n
2
individuals
who have alternative x top–ranked; namely, those individuals in
K(p). Therefore, a majority of individuals prefer alternative x to
every other alternative regardless of the profiles of the last n−k+1
individuals, or those in N \ K(p). Therefore, alternative x will
remain the Condorcet winner at each of {wk, . . . , wn} as we replace
each of the remaining individual’s preference ordering with their
ordering at s. Therefore, we have that {wt} ⊆ ℘.
Next we will show that g(w) = z and the strategy–proofness of
g are not consistent with g(s) = y. Starting at first step of the
standard sequence, we must have g(w1) = y, otherwise individual 1
would manipulate at s via w1(1), since individual 1 prefers any other
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alternative to y at profile s. Similarly, g must select alternative y at
each of {w1, . . . , wk−1}. At the next step in the standard sequence
we will change wk−1(k) = (z, y, . . . ) to wk(k) = w(k). Therefore,
g(wk) 6= z or else individual k would manipulate at wk−1 via wk(k) to
precipitate the selection of her top–ranked alternative z. Similarly,
we must have g(wt) 6= z for t = k, . . . , n. However, this contradicts
the fact that g(wn) = g(w) = z. Therefore, we must drop our
previous assumption that g(st) = y for all values of t. In fact, the
standard sequence argument shows that strategy–proofness requires
that g(s) = z, so that g(st) = z for some value of t. Since st ∈ ℘∗
for all t, we have therefore shown that Xx is the range of g
∗.
We can use g∗ to induce a social choice rule for society N \K(p)
with a domain of all linear orderings on Xx for the individuals in
N \ K(p) in the natural way, and we may also use g∗ to denote
that induced rule. The main result of Aswal, Chatterji, and Sen
[2] establishes the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem for the domain
L(Xx)
H and arbitrary finite H . Therefore, some individual h ∈
N \K(p) is a dictator for g∗. We will next show that h is a dictator
for g itself. This will establish that either g is dictatorial, or for
every k > n
2
and arbitrary p ∈ ℘, if k individuals have a common
top–ranked alternative then g must select that alternative at profile
p.
Choose any z ∈ Xxi\{x, y} and v ∈ ℘ such that v(h) = (z, x, . . . )
and v(i) = (x, . . . , z) for all i 6= h. Let v′ ∈ ℘ denote the profile
at which v′(i) = r(i) for all i ∈ K(p) and v′(i) = v(i) for all i ∈
N \ K(p). We have g(v′) = z because v′ ∈ ℘∗ and h ∈ N \ K(p)
is a dictator for g∗. If {vt} is the standard sequence from v′ to v
we have g(vt) ∈ {x, z} for all t because individual h can precipitate
the selection of x by reporting an ordering with x as the top–ranked
element; such a change would result in k individuals declaring x
to be their top–ranked alternative, since h ∈ N \ K(p). We have
g(v0) = z, and if g(vt) = z then g(vt+1) = z, because if g(vt+1) = x
then t + 1 ∈ K(p) and individual t + 1 could manipulate g at vt
via vt+1(t+ 1). Therefore, g(vt) = z for all t; in particular, g(v) =
g(vn) = z. Because z is bottom–ranked for all i ∈ K(p) and v(i)
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was arbitrarily chosen for all i 6= h in N \K(p), a standard sequence
argument will establish that g(v′′) = z for all v′′ ∈ ℘ such that
v′′1(h) = z. We can use the same argument with z replaced by y to
show that g(v′′) = y for any v′′ ∈ ℘ such that v′′1(h) = y.
It therefore remains to show that g(v′′) = x for any v′′ ∈ ℘
such that v′′1(h) = x. We note that the arguments of the previous
paragraph do not suffice in this case, as we cannot freely change
the placement of the Condorcet winner within individual preference
orderings while remaining in the domain. Let v ∈ ℘ be such that
v1(h) = x and z ∈ Xx is the second–most preferred member ofXx by
individual h at v. Furthermore, let vm(i) = z for all i 6= h. From the
previous paragraph, we know that g(v) ∈ {x, z} because individual h
could precipitate the selection of z by reporting a preference ordering
with z top–ranked.
Let v′ ∈ ℘ be such that v′(h) = v(h) and for all i 6= h, v′(i)
is formed from v(i) by promoting alternative x to the top of the
preference ordering. We know that g(v′) = x since g satisfies una-
nimity. Let {vt} ⊂ ℘ be the standard sequence from v to v′ and
suppose g(v) = g(v0) = z. Next suppose g(vt) = z, and note
that strategy–proofness requires that g(vt+1) = z since individual i
prefers any other alternative to z. By induction we therefore have
that g(vt) = z for all t; however, this contradicts g(vn) = g(v′) = x.
Therefore, we must have that g(v) = x.
Next, let v′′ ∈ ℘ be any profile for which v′′1(h) = x. At this
profile, there exists some alternative y ∈ Xx such that y is the
second–most preferred member of Xx by individual h at profile v
′′.
Next we form profile v′ from v′′ as follows: let v′′(h) = v′(h) and for
all i 6= h form v′(i) from v′′(i) by moving alternative y to the bottom
of individual i’s preference ordering at v′. From the previous para-
graph, we know that g(v′) = x. Let us now consider the coalition
Nv′′(x, y), and let |Nv′′(x, y)| = a. Let us reorder the individuals
so that the members of Nv′′(x, y) are the first a individuals, with
individual h placed first. Let {vt} ∈ ℘ be the standard sequence
from v′ to v′′. From above, we know that g(vt) ∈ {x, y} for all t
and g(v′) = g(v0) = x. For t = 1, . . . , a we must have g(vt) = x;
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otherwise g(vt) = y and individual t would manipulate at vt via
v′(t) to precipitate the selection of x, which individual i prefers to
y at v′′. Next, we must have that g(vt) = x for t = a + 1, . . . , n;
otherwise g(vt) = y and individual t would manipulate at v(t−1) via
v′′(t) to precipitate the selection of y, which individual i prefers to x
at v′. Therefore, we have that g(v′′) = g(vn) = x, so that g(v′′) = x
for any v′′ ∈ ℘ such that v′′1(h) = x.
We have therefore established that individual h is the dictator
with respect to g itself.
Step 3. We have established by induction that if g is non–
dictatorial then g(p) = x for any profile p ∈ ℘ at which x is the
top–ranked alternative for over half the members of N . Assuming
that g is non–dictatorial, it remains to prove that g(p) = x if x
defeats every other member of Xx by a strong majority at p; that
is, at all profiles p ∈ ℘.
Suppose that g is non–dictatorial and there exists a profile p ∈ ℘
such that g(p) = y, where y is an arbitrary element from Xx \
{x}. At this profile there is some majority of individuals who prefer
alternative x to alternative y, namely those in Np(x, y). Let q ∈ ℘
be such that q1(i) = x for all i ∈ Np(x, y) and q(i) = p(i) for all
i ∈ Np(y, x). Next, let us reorder our set of individuals so that
Np(x, y) = {1, 2, . . . , k}, where k >
n
2
and consider the standard
sequence {qt} from p to q.
By assumption, we have that g(p) = g(q0) = y. If g is strategy–
proof, we must also have g(p1) 6= x, or else individual 1 would
manipulate at profile p via p1(1) to precipitate the selection of her
top–ranked alternative at p. Similarly, we must have that g(pt) 6=
x for all t = 0, . . . , k. By Step 2 we must have that g(p
n
2
+1) =
x, since at this profile more than half of the individuals will have
alternative x top–ranked. However, we know that k ≥ n
2
+ 1, and
strategy–proofness requires that g(pk) 6= x. Therefore, we must
have that g(p) = x for all profiles p at which alternative x is the
Condorcet winner. However, this result is inconsistent with the
assumption that |Xxi| ≥ 3; therefore, strategy–proof g must be
dictatorial rule.
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Lemma 2.2.18. Let g be a strategy–proof rule with domain ℘ and
range Xx, where |Xx| ≥ 3 and x 6∈ Xx. Then g must be dictatorial
with respect to the set of alternatives Xx.
Proof. Let g be a strategy–proof rule with domain ℘ and range Xx,
where |Xx| ≥ 3 and x 6∈ Xx.
Step 1. First we define a subset of ℘ over which we may invoke
the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem. Define U ⊂ ℘ as follows: for
all p ∈ U and all i ∈ N , p1(i) = x; pk(i) ∈ Xx for k = 2, . . . , |Xx|+1,
and {p|Xx|+2(i), . . . , pm(i)} is some fixed ordering of the alternatives
in X \ {Xx ∪ x} for all i ∈ N .
It is obvious that every member of U is indeed a member of
℘: x is unanimously top–ranked. Furthermore, preferences with
respect to the elements of the range Xx are unrestricted over U
and |Xx| ≥ 3. We may therefore invoke the Gibbard–Satterthwaite
theorem to show that g must be dictatorial over U . Without loss of
generality suppose individual 1 is the dictator.
Step 2. Let p ∈ U , and p(1) ∈ ℘ be any profile such that
p(1)(i) = p(i) for all i 6= 1. Let y denote individual 1’s most–
preferred alternative from Xx at p
(1). Strategy–proofness therefore
requires that g(p(1)) = y; otherwise, individual 1 could manipulate
at p(1) to a profile in U where y would be selected. Therefore, we
must have that individual 1 is the dictator over all such profiles p(1)
with respect to the set Xx.
Next consider any profile p(2) ∈ ℘ such that p(2)(i) = p(1)(i) for all
i 6= 2. Strategy–proofness requires that g(p(2)) 6≻p(2)(2) y, otherwise
individual 2 would manipulate at p(1) via p(2)(2). Strategy–proofness
further requires that g(p(2)) 6≺p(2)(2) y, otherwise individual 2 would
manipulate at p(2) via p(1)(2). Therefore, we have g(p(2)) = y, so that
individual 1 is the dictator over all such profiles p(2). Proceeding by
induction we therefore have that individual 1 is the dictator over all
such profiles p(k), where k = 1, . . . , n.
We may reconstruct all of ℘ from such a sequence of profiles p(k).
Note that from any q ∈ ℘ we can produce a profile r ∈ U at which
each individual’s relative ordering of the alternatives in Xx is identi-
cal to their relative ordering at q. Let {qt} be the standard sequence
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from r to q. First we show that qt ∈ ℘ for all t = 0, . . . , n. By as-
sumption qn = q ∈ ℘, so |Nqn(x, y)| >
n
2
for all y 6= x. Furthermore
we have |Nqt(x, y)| ≥ |Nqt−1(x, y)| for all t, because at each step
backwards in the sequence we promote alternative x to the top of
individual t−1’s preference ordering. Therefore, {qt} ∈ ℘. Further-
more, qt corresponds to a profile of the type p(t) from above, so that
individual 1 is the dictator at all qt. In particular, individual 1 is
the dictator at an arbitrary profile q in ℘.
Combining the propositions from the previous section, we achieve
a proof of Theorem 2.2.13 which characterizes all strategy–proof
social choice rules over the Condorcet domain for an even number
of individuals. From the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, we know
that a strategy–proof g must therefore satisfy unanimity over any
Condorcet section ℘xi for which |Xxi| ≥ 3. If we require that g
satisfy unanimity over every Condorcet section, we arrive at the
following corollary:
Corollary 2.2.19. Suppose g is a unanimous social choice rule over
the Condorcet domain for an even number of individuals, with range
X. Then g is strategy–proof and satisfies unanimity if and only if:
(i) If there exists xi ∈ X such that |Xxi| = 1, then g|℘xi(p) = xi
for all p ∈ ℘xi;
(ii) If there exists xi ∈ X such that |Xxi| = 2, then g|℘xi satisfies
non–reversal and g|℘xi(p) = xi when there exists p ∈ ℘xi and
xj ∈ Xxi such that xi ≻p(k) xj for all k ∈ N ;
(iii) If there exists xi ∈ X such that |Xxi| ≥ 3, then x ∈ Xxi and
g|℘xi is dictatorial.
Proof. The proof of Corollary 2.2.19 follows directly from Theorem
2.2.13. Unanimity implies that xi ∈ Xxi, so that g|℘xi(p) = xi
whenever |Xxi| = 1, as in (i). Case (iii) remains unchanged save for
this additional requirement.
In case (ii), let v ∈ ℘xi be any profile such that for xj ∈ Xxi,
xi ≻v(k) xj for all k ∈ N ; that is, everyone prefers xi to all other
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alternatives in Xxi at profile v. Furthermore, let v
′ be a unanimous
profile in ℘xi formed from v by promoting alternative xi to the top
of each individual’s preference ordering. Let {vt} be the standard
sequence from v to v′, and suppose that g(v) = g(v0) = xj . Next
suppose g(vt) = xj , then we must have g(v
t+1) = xj , otherwise in-
dividual t + 1 could manipulate at vt via vt+1(t + 1) to precipitate
the selection of the more–preferred alternative xi. By induction, we
therefore have that g(vt) = xj for all t; however, g(v
n) = g(v′) = xi
by unanimity. Therefore, we must have that g(v) = xi, so that alter-
native xi must be selected at any profile at which every individual
prefers it to the other alternative in Xxi .
Thus requiring g to satisfy unanimity does little to alter the fam-
ily of strategy–proof social choice rules, and is not sufficient to ex-
tend the results of Campbell and Kelly [4] as demonstrated by pre-
vious example. However, we may construct an analogous theorem
by introducing two new definitions.
Definition 2.2.20. (Dictatorial Section) P ∈ Π is a dictatorial
section of g if P is a Condorcet section and g|P is dictatorial.
Definition 2.2.21. (Quasi–Majority Rule) A social choice rule g
is quasi–majority rule if for any profile p ∈ P ⊂ ℘C, if g(p) is not
the Condorcet winner at p then the range of g|P contains exactly
two members, one of which is the Condorcet winner at p, and g|P
satisfies non–reversal.
With these definitions, we state an additional result.
Theorem 2.2.22. Suppose that g is a strategy–proof social choice
function on the Condorcet domain with an even number of individ-
uals. If g has no dictatorial sections and satisfies unanimity then it
is quasi–majority rule.
The proof of this theorem follows from Theorem 2.2.13 and the
above definitions. If g has no dictatorial sections, the range of g
over any Condorcet section P must be either a singleton or contain
exactly two members. We note that by requiring unanimity we have
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insured that the Condorcet winner over each Condorcet section is
indeed an element of the range of g over that section.
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Chapter 3
Weak Condorcet Domain
On the strict Condorcet domain, we found a large disparity between
the characterizations of strategy–proof social choice rules when there
were an odd or even number of individuals. In this chapter, we at-
tempt to close the gap between the two results by admitting pro-
files at which individuals are indifferent between alternatives. In
this chapter we are concerned with characterizing non–dictatorial
strategy–proof rules over the weak Condorcet domain. We present
a number of propositions concerning strategy–proof social choice
rules on the domain.
Throughout this chapter, we will use the notation ℘ to refer to
℘CW since in every instance we refer to the weak Condorcet domain.
The weak Condorcet domain differs in many vital respects from
the strict Condorcet domain. In particular, our analysis does not
depend on the parity of the number of individuals. As the proof
of the next lemma establishes, we cannot partition the space as in
the case of the strict Condorcet domain and an even number of
individuals.
Proposition 3.0.23. If g is a strategy–proof social choice rule on
℘, then g has the unanimity property.
Proof. Let p ∈ ℘ be any profile such that p1(k) = {xi} for all k ∈ N ,
so that alternative xi is strictly preferred to every other alternative
by every individual. We will show that g(p) = xi. Since g is onto,
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there exists some r ∈ ℘ such that g(r) = xi.
Let gC be majority rule. Suppose that gC(r) = xi and consider
the standard sequence {pt} from r to p. By construction xi is the
Condorcet winner at p0 = r. Suppose that xi is the Condorcet
winner at pt for some t ∈ {0, . . . , n}. At profile pt+1, alternative xi
must remain the Condorcet winner since we have promoted xi to the
top of individual t + 1’s preference ordering. That is, at each step
the size of the coalition preferring xi to xj increases or is unchanged
for every alternative xj ∈ X \ {xi}, so that
|Npt+1(xi ≻ xj)| = |Npt(xi ≻ xj)|+ 1
or
|Npt+1(xi ≻ xj)| = |Npt(xi ≻ xj)|
and in either case,
|Npt(xi ≻ xj)| >
µpt(xi, xj)
2
⇒ |Npt+1(xi ≻ xj)| >
µpt+1(xi, xj)
2
.
Therefore, xi is the Condorcet winner at every step of the stan-
dard sequence, so that {pt} ⊂ ℘. Note that g(p0) = g(r) = xi.
Suppose that g(pt) = xi and g(p
t+1) = xj 6= xi. Then individ-
ual t+ 1 can manipulate at profile pt+1 via the preference ordering
pt(t+1), since g(pt) = xi ≻pt+1(t+1) xj = g(p
t+1). Strategy–proofness
therefore implies that g(pt+1) = xi, and by induction we have that
g(pn) = g(p) = xi.
Now suppose that gC(r) = xj 6= xi. We will consider two cases:
when µr(xi, xj) is odd and when µr(xi, xj) is even. In either case,
the standard sequence {pt} from r to p may no longer fall within
our domain ℘; we will therefore employ an auxiliary profile q ∈ ℘,
at which xi ≻q(i) xj ≻q(i) xℓ for all i ∈ N and all xℓ ∈ X \ {xi, xj}.
Suppose that µr(xi, xj) is odd. Let {q
t} denote the modified
standard sequence from r to q in which we change the preferences
of the individuals in Nr(xi ≻ xj) first, Nr(xj ≻ xi) second, and
Nr(xi ∼ xj) last. For 0 ≤ t ≤ |Nr(xi ≻ xj)|, alternative xj will
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remain the Condorcet winner; at each step we have
|Nqt(xj ≻ xi)| = |Nr(xj ≻ xi)| ∀xℓ ∈ X \ {xi, xj}
and
|Nqt(xj ≻ xℓ)| ≥ |Nr(xj ≻ xℓ)| ∀xℓ ∈ X \ {xi, xj}.
Furthermore, xj will remain the Condorcet winner at q
t for all
|Nr(xi ≻ xj)| < t <
µr(xi, xj) + 1
2
,
since at each step
|Nqt(xj ≻ xi)| > |Nr(xj ≻ xi)|, ∀xℓ ∈ X \ {xi, xj}
and
|Nqt(xj ≻ xℓ)| ≥ |Nr(xj ≻ xℓ)|, ∀xℓ ∈ X \ {xi, xj}.
For all
µr(xi,xj)+1
2
≤ t < µr(xi, xj) + 1, alternative xi will be the
Condorcet winner at profile, since |Nqt(xi ≻ xℓ)| > |Nqt(xi ≻ xℓ)|
and for all xℓ ∈ X \{xi} since xi is strictly top–ranked by a majority
of the individuals with preferences over the pair (xi, xj).
For at each profile qt for µr(xi, xj) < t ≤ n, we change the
preferences of individuals who were previously indifferent between
the pair (xi, xj) so that they now prefer xi to xj . Therefore for
µr(xi, xj) < t ≤ n,
|Nqt+1(xi ≻ xℓ)| = |Nqt(xi ≻ xℓ)|+ 1, ∀xℓ ∈ X \ {xi}
which ensures that
|Nqt+1(xi ≻ xℓ)| > |Nqt+1(xℓ ≻ xi)|, ∀xℓ ∈ X \ {xi}.
Therefore, we have that alternative xj is the Condorcet winner at
all qt with t = 0, . . . ,
µr(xi,xj)+1
2
and x is the Condorcet winner for
all qt with t =
µr(xi,xj)+1
2
+ 1, . . . , n; so {qt} ⊂ ℘.
By assumption g(q0) = g(r) = xi. If g(q
t) = xi and g(q
t+1) 6= xi,
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then individual t+1 can manipulate at qt+1 via the preference order-
ing qt(t+1) to elicit the selection of alternative xi, since xi ≻qt+1(t+1)
z for all z ∈ X \ {xi}. By induction, we have g(q
t) = xi for
t = 0, . . . , n, so that g(q) = g(qn) = xi. Since p is an arbitrary pro-
file at which each individual has alternative xi strictly top–ranked,
and each individual has xi strictly top–ranked at profile q, we may
again use a standard sequence argument to show that g(p) = xi.
Suppose now that µr(xi, xj) is even. In this case, we will con-
struct another profile r′ by choose exactly one individual j from
Nr(xi ∼ xj) and promoting alternative xj to the top of their pref-
erence ordering, so that xj ≻r′(j) xℓ for all xℓ 6= xj ; for all i 6= j we
will set r′(i) = r(i). At profile r, we have
|Nr(xj ≻ xℓ)| > |Nr(xℓ ≻ xj)|, ∀xℓ ∈ X \ {xj}
and by construction we have
|Nr′(xj ≻ xℓ)| ≥ |Nr(xj ≻ xℓ)|
which together imply that
|Nr′(xj ≻ xℓ)| > |Nr′(xℓ ≻ xj)|, ∀xℓ ∈ X \ {xj}
so that indeed r′ ∈ ℘. Furthermore, suppose that g(r′) = xℓ 6= xj ;
then individual j can manipulate at profile r′ via the preference
ordering r(j), since g(r) = xj ≻r′(j) xℓ = g(r
′) for any xℓ ∈ X \{xj}.
Since µr(xi, xj) was even, we have that µr′(xi, xj) is odd since we
have increased the number of individuals preferring xj to xi by one.
Therefore, we may use the arguments of the previous paragraphs
with r′ in place of r to show that g(p) = xi.
The next two propositions utilize our results on the strict Con-
dorcet domain. We first introduce two new definitions.
Definition 3.0.24 (Fixed Odd Subdomain). Let N = {1, . . . , n}
be the set of voters and X = {x1, . . . , xm}. Let NFO ⊂ N denote a
fixed subset of individuals such that |NFO| = nFO is odd. Denote the
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fixed odd subdomain with respect to the set NFO as ℘FO ⊂ ℘CW and
define it as follows: for all pin℘FO, for all i ∈ NFO, p(i) ∈ LS(X)
and for all i ∈ N \NFO,
p(i) = (x1 ∼ x2 ∼ · · · ∼ xm).
That is, all individuals in NFO have preference orderings that are
strict linear orders, and all other individuals are completely indif-
ferent between all of the alternatives.
The next definition is analogous to the previous, except that the
parity of the set of individuals with strict preferences is even.
Definition 3.0.25 (Fixed Even Subdomain). Let N = {1, . . . , n}
be the set of voters and X = {x1, . . . , xm}. Let NFE ⊂ N denote a
fixed subset of individuals such that |NFE| = nFE is even. Denote the
fixed odd subdomain with respect to the set NFE as ℘FE ⊂ ℘CW and
define it as follows: for all pin℘FE, for all i ∈ NFE, p(i) ∈ LS(X)
and for all i ∈ N \NFE,
p(i) = (x1 ∼ x2 ∼ · · · ∼ xm).
That is, all individuals in NFE have preference orderings that are
strict linear orders, and all other individuals are completely indif-
ferent between all of the alternatives.
With these definitions, we state the following two propositions
Proposition 3.0.26 (Restricted to a Fixed Odd Subdomain). If g
is a strategy–proof social choice rule over ℘CW , then or any fixed odd
subdomain ℘FO, g|℘F O must be dictatorial or majority rule.
Proposition 3.0.27 (Restricted to a Fixed Even Subdomain). If
g is a strategy–proof social choice rule over ℘CW , then for any fixed
even subdomain ℘FE, g|℘F E must be dictatorial or satisfy the follow-
ing properties
(i) If there exists xi ∈ X such that |Xxi| = 2, then g|℘xi satisfies
non–reversal;
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(ii) If there exists xi ∈ X such that |Xxi| ≥ 3, then xi 6∈ X and
g|℘xi is dictatorial with respect to the set of alternatives Xxi,
where ℘xi is the set of profiles in ℘FE for which alternative xi is the
Condorcet winner, and Xxi is the range of g over ℘xi.
In each of these propositions, we have applied the results of the
strict Condorcet domain to subdomains for which some fixed number
of individuals have strict preferences and the remaining individuals
are completely indifferent over all the alternatives. The proof of
these propositions follows almost immediately from our previous
result. Since any strategy–proof rule g must be unanimous, g must
have full range over any fixed odd or even subdomain ℘FO or ℘FE
because in particular each of these subdomains include the profiles
at which all the individuals in the fixed set (NFO or NFE) have
alternative xi top–ranked for every alternative xi.
To prove Propositions 3.0.26 (respectively, Proposition 3.0.27)
using the previous results, each standard sequence argument should
be augmented so that the individuals in NFO (respectively, NFE)
come first, followed by the individuals who are completely indiffer-
ent. Because preferences are strict on the first set of individuals, for
any stardard sequence {qt} the arguments of the previous chapter go
through for all t = 0, . . . , nFO (respectively, t = 0, . . . , nFE). More-
over, since the preferences of the remaining individuals are fixed over
the entire domain, g(qt) = g(qt+1) for t = nFO + 1, . . . , n (respec-
tively, t = nFO + 1, . . . , n). Therefore, we can essentially drag the
individuals in N \NFO (respectively, N \NFO) through the proofs
of Chapter 2 with respect to the subdomain ℘FO (respectively, ℘FE)
without substaintial changes.
We have therefore shown that any strategy–proof rule g over the
weak Condorcet domain must
• Satisfy unanimity;
• Coincide with either dictatorial or majority rule over all fixed
odd subdomains, and;
• Satisfy two conditions (see Proposition 3.0.27) over all fixed
even subdomains.
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Although we have not shown that these results are sufficient to char-
acterize strategy–proof rules over the weak Condorcet domain, we
remain hopeful that further work will provide a complete character-
ization.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
Combining the results of this paper with those of Campbell and
Kelly [4], we have established a complete theory of non–dictatorial
strategy–proof social choice rules on the strict Condorcet domain
for an arbitrary finite number of individuals. In this paper we have
characterized the family of strategy–proof social choice rules over the
strict Condorcet domain for an even number of individuals. As made
evident through examples, this class of rules is much broader than
in the case of odd number of individuals. We note that majority
rule remains strategy–proof in the even case, and that under this
rule the range associated with each Condorcet section is a singleton,
namely the Condorcet winner.
The disparity between the results of this paper and the results
of Campbell and Kelly [4] are entirely due to the Condorcet section
partition in the case of even number of individuals. It is this par-
tition that allows for more exotic strategy–proof rules to exist, and
it is the barriers between Condorcet sections that cause the method
of proof used in the odd case to fail when applied generally to the
even case. We believe that it may be possible to achieve results
more similar to the odd case by expanding the domain to the weak
Condorcet domain.
Although we do not yet have a complete characterization of
strategy–proof rules over the weak Condorcet domain, we have es-
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tablished the unanimity lemma for strategy–proof rules as well as
two restriction conditions. In the proof of this lemma, we showed
that the weak Condorcet domain cannot be partitioned like the strict
Condorcet domain in the case of even number of individuals. In the
proof of the propositions, we utilized the results of Chapter 2 on
well–specified subdomains. With these results, we maintain hope
that a characterization can be discovered and that majority rule
may be the unique non–dictatorial and strategy–proof social choice
rule on the weak Condorcet domain.
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